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The influence of FOMC member characteristics on the monetary policy decision-making 
process 
Abstract 
This paper provides new empirical evidence on a monetary policy committee with 
heterogeneous members whose decisions affect the efficacy of monetary policy. It thereby 
provides a link between the literature on monetary policy committees and central bank monetary 
policy implementation through monetary rules. Using a novel dataset of the idiosyncratic 
characteristics of FOMC members, over the period from August 1979 to February 2014, the 
empirical findings show that characteristics such as education, age, and, to a lesser extent, work 
experience are not important in understanding the FOMC decision-making process. Instead, the 
results point to the importance of time spent within the Federal Reserve System, tenure on the 
FOMC itself, and the influence of the Chair in shaping the decision-making process. The results 
are expected to have implications for the capacity of economic agents, as well as various markets 
in the economy, to more readily interpret public (monetary policy) information that reaches 
them. This makes the monetary policy decision process less noisy and, thus, enhances those 
agents’ and markets’ capability to attach the correct weight to this information. 
Keywords: Monetary policy committees; characteristics of committee members; monetary policy 
rules: FOMC 
1. Introduction 
A great number of theoretical models emphasize the importance of private expectations in 
determining macroeconomic outcomes (King et al., 2008; Eusepi, 2010; Lamla and Maag, 2012; 
Givens, 2012; among others). Managing inflation and/or output expectations is a crucial feature of 
monetary policymaking, so the need for forward policy guidance is dramatically amplified, 
especially in crises periods and/or the downward trend of the business cycle. 
In its traditional form, the expectations channel is subtle and fragile as it depends on the 
private agents’ interpretation of interest rate changes. King (2005) states that “… because inflation 
expectations matter to the behaviour of the households and firms, the critical aspect of monetary 
policy is how decisions of the central bank affect those expectations …”. Policy decisions can be 
understood in various ways and facilitating private agents’ information processing is one reason 
why central banks complement their actions with communication to the public. Moreover, given 
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the delay between policy actions and their real effects, central bank communication provides 
policymakers with a way to promptly affect private expectations to shorten the transmission lags 
of monetary policy.  
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) is responsible for the implementation of 
U.S. monetary policy, and the way monetary policy is implemented is extremely important in 
determining the course of output growth and inflation stability. Moreover, the effectiveness of 
monetary policy is sensitive to the link between monetary policy and asset price movements. This 
link has been of perennial interest to both policy makers and academic researchers, since such 
asset prices may affect real activity through the main channels of the transmission mechanism 
from asset prices to economic activity identified in the literature: households’ wealth effects on 
consumption expenditure, Tobin’s Q effects on investments, and financial accelerator effects on 
investments. However, Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) argue that the gains of including asset prices in 
monetary policy rules in practice adds little to stabilizing output and inflation. Moreover, 
financial markets can benefit from FOMC monetary policy decisions through an informational 
mechanism that conveys expectations about the future course of interest rates. This mechanism 
allows market participants to revise their expectations about the impact of those interest rates on 
future asset prices, and, through the monetary transmission channels, to the real economy (Rosa, 
2013). 
There has been acceptance in the literature that, although left in the shadows, governance 
structures have large consequences on macroeconomic performances (Al-Marhubi, 2004). Fry et 
al. (2000) report that only a minority of central banks make decisions by consensus, with the 
more popular method being a formal vote with decision by simple majority. Riboni and Ruge-
Murcia (2013) document the role of dissents in monetary policy committees in the cases of the 
Bank of England and the Riksbank in increasing the forecasting performance of future monetary 
policy decisions. In a recent paper, Chappell et al. (2014) argue that monetary policy decisions 
turn out to be more effective if taken through a committees mechanism that on an individual 
basis, unless the committee members cede power to the chairman of that committee. Through an 
empirical model, they provide evidence in the cases of the Bank of England and in Sweden’s 
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Riksbank that the chairman in the former case cannot affect monetary policy decisions reached 
by committee members’ votes, while in the latter case his impact is highly influential1. 
The goal of our paper is to investigate in what way the idiosyncratic characteristics of 
FOMC members have influenced U.S. monetary policy decision-making over the period 1979-
2014; a sample period covering the tenures of Paul Volcker, Alan Greenspan, and Ben Bernanke 
as Chair of the FOMC. This paper is, to our knowledge, the first to deal with the explicit influence 
of an extended number of biographical factors on the monetary policy decision-making process of 
the FOMC in the modern era. Using a novel, hand-collected, data-set we investigate the influence 
of characteristics of the composition of the FOMC in making monetary policy decisions, the 
performance of those decisions in terms of deviations from a benchmark rate, and dissent from 
the majority decision. This paper is the first to study the link between such diverse aspects of the 
FOMC decision-making process, and also the first to consider FOMC decisions in the modern era. 
This time-frame is of particular importance in light of the changing dynamics of the U.S. 
economy which has evolved through states of high inflation, low growth at the start of the 
Volcker era, to a ‘goldilocks’ period of low inflation, high growth in the Greenspan era, and onto 
the Great Recession and unconventional monetary policy of the Bernanke era; previous work has 
largely focused on earlier periods.  
The results are expected to be of high importance to a variety of economic agents. To 
identify what really drives FOMC monetary policy decisions statements is not always completely 
anticipated. Hence, a greater understanding of such determinants may allow economic agents to 
revise their expectations more efficiently and rebalance their portfolios appropriately. In addition, 
economic agents can make use of the idiosyncratic information related to the characteristics of 
FOMC members to anticipate the future nature of monetary policy (vis-à-vis relative policy 
tightness) which has implications for long-term output and inflation performance. 
                                                             
1 Chappell et al. (2014) qualify this conclusion since two changes in chairmanship of the Riksbank policy 
committee closely align with inflection points in the path of interest rates. This may lead to an inference 
that the new Chair has a large influence on policy, when in fact the association is coincidental. While this is 
a potential issue for our paper too, since the appointment of Bernanke to the Chair of the FOMC occurs not 




A better understanding of idiosyncratic drivers provides important benefits. For instance, 
improved forecasting of interest rates and asset prices would lead to a reduction in the volatility of 
asset prices, which in turn may make monetary policy more effective. 
To foreshadow our empirical findings and utilising an ordered logit specification, we find 
there is an increase in the likelihood of Fed Funds target rate reductions as the Chair’s tenure 
increases, and the proportion of FOMC members with experience in Government becomes 
greater. The importance of Chair tenure is re-emphasised when considering policy deviations 
from the Taylor Rule benchmark; deviations become greater, and generally more negative, as 
tenure increases. Conversely, as FOMC members spend more time working within the Federal 
Reserve System they seemingly develop a preference for monetary policy that is tighter than that 
suggested by the Taylor Rule. While dissent from the majority vote declines as the Chair is in situ 
for longer, FOMC members with a long history in the Fed and/or with a background in academia 
are most likely to express dissent at FOMC meetings. Finally, results for macroeconomic variables 
suggest that the FOMC acts to stabilise economic activity. 
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses related literature. 
Section 3 outlines the data used in our study. Section 4 details the empirical methodology and 
discusses the results of our empirical investigation. Section 5 summarises robustness testing, with 
a particular emphasis on period sub-samples, and section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature on monetary policy and monetary committees 
Monetary Policy Decision-Making 
This paper links two major strands of the monetary policy literature: The first thread of 
literature looks at how monetary policy committees operate. Much of this literature uses a 
theoretical approach (Matsen and Roisland, 2005; Sibert, 2005), but there is a developing 
empirical literature with much of the evidence focusing on the Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) of the Federal Reserve (Havrilesky, 1993; Blinder, 2004; Chappell et al., 2004). Notably, 
both research threads suggest that the personal characteristics of committee members may 
influence the monetary policy decision-making process.  
Chappell et al. (1995) note that Presidents of regional Federal Reserve Banks are more 
likely to vote for tighter monetary policy, and members of the Board of Governors for looser 
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monetary policy, something which is attributed to the average career experience (in private 
industry) and educational background (generally without PhD) of Fed Bank Presidents. Caporale 
and Grier (2000) point to changes in the political party holding the presidency and a majority in 
Congress as the primary sources of changes in real interest rate regimes (given that both inflation 
and nominal interest rate components are heavily determined by monetary policy decisions). 
Chappell et al. (2004) address the important question of the competing pressures of majority rule, 
consensus building, and the power of the Chairman in decision-making. They construct an 
original data set recording desired Federal Funds rates for each member of the Fed Committee 
over the period 1970-78, with their results suggesting a disproportionate influence of the 
Chairman on the policy process.  
Blinder (2004) discusses the ‘quiet revolution’ in central banking practice and provides 
evidence in favour of making monetary policy decisions by committee. Blinder (2007) extends 
this discussion to determination of the optimal method for central banks to make decisions in 
terms of individualistically (through voting) or collegially (through discussion), and how the 
decision is communicated to the markets, so as to maximize the expected monetary policy 
outcome. The article concludes that decision-making by committee has many advantages, but an 
individualistic committee may confuse observers by speaking with too many voices. As such, the 
appropriate central bank communication policy depends entirely on the idiosyncratic 
characteristics of decision makers.  
The above results are confirmed by the empirical results of Riboni and Ruge-Murcia 
(2010) who investigate the implications of monetary policy making by committee under a number 
of different voting protocols. Specifically, they show that committees share unwritten rules and 
informal procedures that deliver observationally equivalent policy decisions vis-à-vis other 
schemes of monetary policy decision making. 
Göhlmann and Vaubel (2007) present a multi-country analysis on how the education and 
occupational characteristics of central bankers affect their inflation preferences. Based on the 
importance of monetary policy efficacy to fight both inflation and large output gaps, their 
empirical findings highlight that, given the exchange rate regime and degree of central bank 
independence, central banks are shown to be more efficient in lowering inflation when the voting 
majority is held by former members of the central bank staff and economists as opposed to 
alternate occupational groups have. They attribute these findings to the fact that central banks 
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primarily attract economists who are monetary conservatives, and the longer they remain with 
the central bank the more they are inclined towards price level stability owing to institutional 
tendencies.  
Extending his prior work, Blinder (2009) discusses the specific features of monetary policy 
committees that may be used to design a monetary policy apparatus along the lines of best 
practice as determined in the literature. Salient features include the size and composition of the 
committee, the degree of consensus required, the role of the committee chair, voting procedures, 
methods of appointment and communication techniques. 
Meade and Stasavage (2008) approach the role of idiosyncratic characteristics of 
committee members in monetary policy efficacy through a theoretical model. They investigate 
why increased levels of transparency, in the form of published verbatim transcripts of committee 
meetings, are not desirable if the quality of committee deliberation suffers as a result. The 
empirical test of their model provides robust evidence that Fed Governors and voting regional 
Federal Reserve Presidents have been less likely to express verbal dissent on policy decisions since 
the change in FOMC communication policy in 1993. Such results are expected to have significant 
implications for the design of monetary policy communication as well as for the operation of 
committee-based government decision making. Within a similar framework, Harris et al. (2011) 
investigate whether both the channels through which members of the Bank of England’s 
Monetary Policy Committee are appointed can affect the decision to dissent from the majority 
decision and, also, whether differences in career backgrounds has an impact on the manner in 
which monetary policy tackles inflation and unemployment. Their empirical results suggest that, 
contrary to the FOMC literature, it is institutional constraints associated with UK monetary 
policy rather than the career background and other characteristics of the MPC members that 
influences voting behaviour. This supports the work of Besley et al. (2008), who note 
homogeneous reactions to inflation forecasts, and output gaps, with regards background 
characteristics of MPC members, and that inflation forecasts do a good job of predicting member 
behaviour. Similarly, Smales (2013) suggests that the decision-making behaviour of the Reserve 
Bank of Australia is related to the inflation-targeting framework within which the Bank operates. 
A separate part of this literature focuses on the strategic and psychological factors 
affecting the behaviour of monetary policy committee members. Rülke and Tillmann (2011) study 
the extent of herding behaviour in FOMC member forecasts for growth, inflation and 
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unemployment, and find no evidence of herding, while anti-herding is particularly important for 
non-voting members.  The findings support the view that forecasts signal FOMC members’ policy 
preferences. Claussen et al. (2012) emphasize the role of psychological factors, such as 
overconfidence, in monetary policy making. The factors are used to explain disagreements within 
committee members, the provision of decision power to those members, and the fact that 
chairmen of monetary policy committees rarely find themselves on the losing side of the 
committee vote. They theorise that the optimal influence of the chairman is related to the degree 
of overconfidence, and is limited when overconfidence is perceived to be a major issue. El-Shagi 
and Jung (2015), note evidence of coordination between Presidents of the Federal Reserve 
Districts that brings their voting preferences into line with the Fed Chair. Weise (2012) suggests 
that political considerations contributed to delays in tackling the rise in U.S. inflation in the 
1970s. 
In a recent paper, Nakazono (2013) attempts to investigate the strategic behaviour of each 
board member in the FOMC by using panel data on inflation forecasts provided by them prior to 
their semi-annual monetary policy report to the Congress. Their empirical findings display that 
FOMC members heavily rely on past forecasts when they submit their forecasts, with the average 
of their projections being rational. At the same time, forecasts by governors agree much with the 
previous consensus of FOMC members’ forecasts, while this is not the case with non-governors 
whose forecasts deviate aggressively from the previous consensus. Overall, his results imply that 
these FOMC members behave strategically, in the sense that governors want to present policy-
consistent forecasts to the Congress, while non-governors utilize their forecasts to influence 
monetary policy decision making.  
The second strand of the literature is fundamentally associated with both the role of 
monetary rules in the central banks’ decision process and the implication of the deviations from 
such a rule. Numerous types of monetary policy rules have been discussed in the literature, with 
such rules serving as benchmarks for policymakers in assessing the current stance of monetary 
policy and in determining a future policy path. The rule that has attracted the most attention is 
that of Taylor (1993), this rule states that the instrument of the monetary authority reacts to two 
key goal variables: deviations of contemporaneous inflation from a pre-set target rate and 
deviations of contemporaneous real output from its potential level. The Taylor Rule describes 
how central banks maintain low and stable inflation and avoid large fluctuations of output and 
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employment by utilizing the intervention in the level of interest rates. The rule states that 
nominal interest rates react to the inflation deviation and the output gap, with the seminal 
contemporaneous rule specified as: 
r = r* + π + 0.5(π –π*) + 0.5 y      (1) 
Where r is the federal funds rate, r* is the equilibrium real interest rate, π is the average of 
current inflation and the previous three-period inflation, π* is the inflation target, and y is the 
output gap. The forward-looking Taylor rule describes how central banks respond to the expected 
inflation deviation as well as to the expected output gap. Among the forward-looking rules, the 
most prominent is that proposed by Clarida et al.(1998; 2000): 
it* = i* + β [E(πt+n) – π*] + γ E(yt+q)     (2) 
Eq. (2) is considered within an inflation targeting framework in the instance that the 
expected output gap can be treated as pressure on future inflation. Given the expected output gap, 
when the expected inflation rate is higher than the inflation target, the nominal rate is expected 
to increase and this will reduce investment and consumption expenditures by firms and 
individuals respectively, leading to reduced aggregate demand and, consequently, to lower 
inflation. Therefore, a Taylor rule can provide a nominal anchor for the central bank to react to 
various shocks, as well as providing an automatic stabilizer for the macroeconomy.  
An extant literature utilizes the Taylor Rule to evaluate the efficacy of a central bank’s 
decision making process (Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy, 2011; Ferrero, 2012; Givens, 2012; Taylor, 
2012;among others). This literature demonstrates that this simple rule, or close variations of it, 
approximate the policy decisions of several major central banks. Moreover, empirical evidence 
(McCallum and Nelson, 1999; Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999) appears robust to replacing current 
data with lagged data owing to the persistence of inflation and output measures.  
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2003) note that the Taylor rule has had a big impact in the way the 
FOMC implements monetary policy, although they recognize that it is not used (or should be 
used) as a mechanical rule but instead as a guide-post for monetary policy. This serves to enhance 
the central bank’s credibility in fighting persistent deviations from a target inflation rate, and 
allows for deviations from the prescribed rule when economic conditions call for it. Batini and 
Haldane (1999) make the reasonable claim that the central bank has more information about the 
state of the economy at the time of decision making than is captured by inflation and output data 
9 
 
alone, and it is also sensible to assume that authorities make policy decisions based on expected 
future economic conditions. 
For this reason, a number of researchers prefer forward-looking, or forecast-based, policy 
rules in place of contemporaneous Taylor Rule methodology. Batini and Haldane (1999) show 
that forward-looking rules serve as stabilizing mechanisms to counter-balance the backward-
looking behaviour of the private sector. However, there is not clear empirical evidence in support 
of forecast-based rules. Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) find forecast-based rules only marginally 
outperform the contemporaneous rule. While Taylor (2000) notes that as long as forecasts are not 
too far into the future they will be very close to their contemporaneous counterparts.  
There are several reasons why policy may occasionally deviate from monetary rules. 
Liquidity crises that require a temporary injection of reserves by the central bank represent one 
reason why it might be desirable to temporarily lower the policy rate below the level prescribed 
by a simple rule. Another reason for deviating from rule-like behaviour might be a shock to the 
aggregate price level. Such a shock might normally call for a tightening of policy, but if the shock 
is seen as transitory, with no impact on inflation expectations, it might not require the response 
prescribed by a rule. Finally, policymakers may respond to economic indicators other than those 
incorporated in the simple rule. In short, a simple rule may simply not capture all of the 
contingencies that might confront policymakers (Taylor, 1993; 2008). Overall, the lack of 
flexibility is the main reason why central banks are reluctant to commit to a policy rule. As long 
as shocks to the economy are frequent and unpredictable, central banks need the flexibility to 
implement and communicate their monetary policy away from a pre-specified rule. 
3. Data 
FOMC Member Characteristics 
Our analysis covers the period from August 1979 to February 2014. This period runs from 
the appointment of Paul Volcker as FOMC Chair in August 1979, through the tenure of Alan 
Greenspan starting in August 1987, and covering the two terms of Ben Bernanke (February 2006 – 
February 2014). The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) consists of twelve members; the 
seven members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve system, the president of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and four of the remaining eleven Reserve Bank presidents 
who serve one-year terms on a rotating basis. The sample includes 3,226 voting observations, for 
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87 members, over 294 FOMC meetings held during this period. Our key concerns involve 
understanding which idiosyncratic characteristics of FOMC members are important in the FOMC 
decision-making process, what drives deviations from a benchmark monetary policy rule2, and 
the likelihood of dissent by individuals from the policy decision. 
Whilst our paper does not present an explicit theory of the formation of monetary policy, it 
does recognize that individuals’ preferences are likely to have been moulded as they were 
educated and as they pursued careers prior to serving on the FOMC. We compile a novel database 
based on a number of personal characteristics of the FOMC members using official biographies3. 
The demographic characteristics that we consider include age, gender, and education level. In 
addition, Havrilesky and Schweitzer (1990) and Chappell et al. (1995) identify the importance of 
capturing work experience variables; they suggest that career proximity to central government 
may be more associated with expansionary monetary policy, while training as an economist may 
be associated with preferences for tighter policy. The work experience profile of each FOMC 
member is captured with a series of dummy variables indicating experience as an academic, in 
government, or in industry. 
Finally, we capture a number of variables related to the nature of the appointment to the 
FOMC. Chappell et al. (1993) argue that monetary policy preferences systematically vary by 
political party; we seek to capture this using a dummy variable indicating the party of the 
President at the time appointment is made to the FOMC. Havrilesky and Gildea (1992, 1995) note 
that Governors are based in Washington D.C. and are reliant on the Chair for staff support. In 
contrast, the regional Bank Presidents have their own research staff and other resources at their 
proposal which may promote independence; a dummy variable indicating whether the FOMC 
member is a Governor is introduced to capture whether this has an impact on voting behaviour. 
Despite the fact the FOMC decision is made by majority rule, it is readily apparent that the Chair, 
along with other senior FOMC members, has a disproportionate influence on the policy process 
(Chappell et al., 2004); we introduce dummy variables for the Chair and Vice-Chair, along with 
the tenure of the Chair. The length of time served at the Federal Reserve, or on the FOMC, may 
also be important; it is possible that the longer time that Members spend working within the same 
organisation, or in the same role, the more likely they are to engage in group-think and not seek 
                                                             
2 We utilise both current period and forward-looking versions of the Taylor Rule as a benchmark. 
3 The website of the Federal Reserve contains biographies for all members of the FOMC and Board of 
Governors since 1914: http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/bios/board/boardmembership.htm 
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to dissent from the group decision, alternatively it may be that longer tenure provides the 
confidence to take independent views. A full list of variables, with descriptions, is reported in 
Table 1. 
<Insert Table 1> 
FOMC Decision and Macroeconomic Characteristics 
A key feature of our analysis is the consideration of both the monetary policy decision 
announced by the FOMC, and also the voting behaviour underlying that decision. In the first 
instance, we consider the ordered decision to decrease rates, leave rates unchanged, or increase 
rates, before investigating deviations of policy decisions from a benchmark policy rule. Finally, 
we contemplate the voting behaviour in terms of dissent from the announced decision. We 
manually extract voting data from the FOMC’s Record of Policy Actions4. For each FOMC 
meeting, the Record documents individuals’ votes on the proposed monetary policy directive. By 
the time a formal vote is taken, majority support has already been assured, but members can and 
do register dissent5. Based on the description in the Record, we classify votes as assents, dissent 
favouring more expansionary (easier) policy, dissent favouring less expansionary (tighter) policy, 
and dissent based on the language expressed in the statement. A FOMC member may vote for no 
change or a(n) decrease (increase) in the interest-rate but still be classed as dissenting for easier 
(tighter) policy if the rate chosen by the FOMC is higher (lower) than their chosen rate. 
In addition to the Fed Fund target rate following the FOMC decision, we consider 
deviations of the Fed Fund target from a benchmark nominal interest rate suggested by the Taylor 
(1993) Rule6, and determined using eq.(1) and eq.(2). A number of variables are also introduced to 
describe the macroeconomic conditions at the time of the FOMC meeting; economic growth 
represented by GDP, inflationary pressures characterized by the GDP deflator, and market 
expectations of future interest rates denoted by the slope of the yield curve. The macroeconomic 
data is obtained from Bloomberg in “real-time”, that is, we use data that the FOMC members 
                                                             
4 Detailed transcripts and other information surrounding the FOMC decision making process can be found 
on the Federal Reserve website: http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomc_historical.htm   
5 The Chair has never dissented from a proposed directive, and Chappell et al. (1995) report that no 
directive has ever been defeated. 
6 We consider both current period and forward-looking versions of the Taylor Rule and find no qualitative 
difference in our results. 
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would have possessed at the time that the relevant meeting was held (and monetary policy 
decision made)7. 
Summary statistics are reported in Table 2. Panel A shows that the Federal Funds target rate 
has averaged 5.75% over the sample period, with a high of 19.5% occurring in December 1980, 
and a low of 0.125% (the mid-point of the 0-0.25% range) prevailing from December 2008 until 
the end of the sample. Interestingly, while the deviations from the benchmark nominal interest 
rate implied by the Taylor Rule have been significant at times (up to 634b.p.) on average the 
deviation has been just 6b.p8. The average age of a FOMC member is nearly 57 years, with the 
youngest, Kevin Warsh, at 36 years when appointed to the Board of Governors, and the oldest 
was Alan Greenspan who was approaching his 80th birthday upon leaving the FOMC. The average 
length of time within the Federal Reserve System is a little over 16 years, average time since 
appointment to a senior FOMC position is 5½ years, and the mean tenure of the Chair approaches 
7-years. 
<Insert Table 2> 
Panel B reveals how the FOMC member characteristics have changed over time. The 
proportion of FOMC members educated to doctorate level has increased since Alan Greenspan 
was appointed to the Chair. While the proportion of female FOMC members has increased in 
recent times the reported figure still equates to less than three women taking part in each FOMC 
vote. The work experience of FOMC members has remained relatively constant over time in 
terms of academics (≈50%) and prior experience in government roles (≈95%) but the proportion 
of members with industry experience has declined to just 40% under Ben Bernanke. Reflecting 
the changing political environment, the number of appointees by the Republican Party increased 
from 21% to 70% during the tenure of Alan Greenspan before falling back to 40% more recently.  
Finally, descriptive statistics illustrate that the Fed Funds Target was much higher on 
average (11.83%), while Volcker was FOMC Chair as the Federal Reserve battled inflation, lower 
while Greenspan was in situ (4.81%), and lowest under Bernanke (1.50%), following the financial 
crisis of 2008-09. Deviations from the Taylor rule suggest that policy was more restrictive than 
the benchmark under Volcker, close to neutral during Greenspan’s tenure, and expansive for 
                                                             
7 The timing of information is important; Orphandides (2001) notes that policy recommendations using 
real-time data differ substantially from those obtained using ex-post revised data. 
8 The maximum difference is greater using a forward-looking Taylor rule. 
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Bernanke’s stewardship. Focusing on the FOMC target rate decisions (Panel C) it is apparent that 
leaving rates unchanged is the most prevalent outcome (53% of decisions), with decisions also 
tending to be autocorrelated, where easing is followed by further easing and tightening is 
followed by further tightening;, this is clearly evident in the evolution of the Fed Funds target 
rate depicted in Figure 1. 
<Insert Figure 1 – Evolution of Fed Funds Rate> 
4. Empirical Results 
Factors influencing the FOMC Decision 
The FOMC decision is viewed as the committee choosing from one of three mutually 
exclusive choices: to ease monetary policy (decrease the Fed Funds Target), leave monetary policy 
unchanged (no-change to the Fed Funds Target), or tighten monetary policy (increase the Fed 
Funds Target). A natural candidate for modelling such behaviour is the ordered logit model: 
𝑍𝑘𝑘∗ = 𝑥𝑘𝑘′ 𝛽 + 𝜀𝑘𝑘 , 
𝑍𝑘𝑘 = −1          if 𝑍𝑘𝑘∗ ≤ 𝛾1, 
𝑍𝑘𝑘 = 0    if 𝛾1 < 𝑍𝑘𝑘∗ ≤ 𝛾2 , 
𝑍𝑘𝑘 = +1       if 𝑍𝑘𝑘∗ > 𝛾2 
Where 𝑍𝑘𝑘∗ is a stacked vector of -1s, 0s and +1s corresponding to the FOMC decision to ease, 
leave un-changed, or tighten monetary policy. 𝑥𝑘𝑘is a matrix containing FOMC member 
characteristics and macroeconomic controls, as independent variables, β is a vector of parameter 
estimates, and ε is the error term9.  
Maximum likelihood estimates for the ordered logit specification are presented in Table 3. 
The specification in the first column contains only explanatory variables related to the make-up 
of the FOMC and shows that the length of time working within the Federal Reserve System 
(FED_JOIN) increases the likelihood of an increase in interest rates, while an increase in the 
proportion FOMC members appointed by a Republican administration (P_PARTY) reduces the 
likelihood of tighter monetary policy. We note this result is contrary to conventional wisdom and 
                                                             
9 Throughout the empirical analysis in this paper, cluster robust standard errors (Rogers, 1993) are reported, 
with the individual member as the cluster. Analysis was also conducted based on the robust errors of Huber 




the extant literature (Chappell et al., 1993) which suggests that Democrats would prefer easier 
policy and Republicans tighter policy. However, much of the relevant prior literature focuses on 
an earlier sample period than we consider here. Our sample period witnesses a unique era with 
low levels of inflation generally accompanied by high productivity growth, and low levels of 
volatility in economic growth, creating an environment where Republican FOMC members are 
able to prioritise other goals. The negative EDUCATION coefficient indicates that as the level of 
education of FOMC members increases (from Bachelors to Doctorate level) there is an increased 
propensity to reduce interest rates. 
<Insert Table 3> 
Augmenting this initial specification with the introduction of macroeconomic variables 
(column 2), renders the aforementioned results insignificant and reveals that prior experience in 
Government work (GOVT) and length of tenure by the Fed Chair (CHAIR_TIME) are 
particularly important characteristics in determining the FOMC decision; the other FOMC 
member characteristics are no longer well-defined. A greater proportion of experience in 
Government is significantly more likely to produce a vote to decrease interest rates (or 
alternatively less likely to increase rates). As the Chair’s tenure increases there is an increase in 
the likelihood of FOMC easing (a significant and negative coefficient), consistent with the idea 
that the Chair will not need to display inflation fighting credentials to the market as the time in 
office increases10. Notably, the Board of Governors (BOG) coefficient is not well-defined and this 
is in contrast with the results of Chappell and McGregor (2000) who note that Governors have a 
significant tendency to ease rates.  
Results for the macroeconomic variables support the notion that the FOMC attempts to 
stabilize the business cycle. The positive and significant coefficient for GDP Growth and 
INFLATION suggest that monetary policy was tightened as output growth accelerated and eased 
when it slowed. Consistent with observed behaviour in the bond markets, monetary policy is 
tightened (eased) following a steepening (flattening) in the yield curve (YLD_C). The identified 
results remain when a lagged deviation from the Taylor Rule (1993), Lag(D_TAYLOR), is 
introduced (column 3). Importantly, larger, persistent and positive (negative) deviations from the 
                                                             
10 The ‘inflation-fighting credentials’ of the FOMC, and the Chair in particular, are often a focus of media 




nominal interest rate implied by the Taylor Rule result in an increased likelihood of monetary 
policy tightening (easing). The coefficients for the cut-points between decision choices (γ1 and γ2) 
indicate that a higher (lower) threshold is required to increase (decrease) the Fed Funds target. 
Policy deviations from the Taylor Rule  
So far, we have been able to identify characteristics of FOMC members that may lead to a 
propensity to increase or decrease the Fed Funds target, but without having a clear picture of the 
relative level of interest rates vis-à-vis a monetary policy rule. Having identified in the previous 
section that deviations from the Taylor Rule play a significant role in explaining changes in the 
level of monetary policy, in this section we seek to determine whether the characteristics of the 
FOMC board play a role in such deviations, and relate this to the relative level of monetary policy 
‘tightness’. We perform panel regressions with deviations of the Federal Funds target rate from 
the Taylor Rule as the dependent variable. As a robustness check, we use an alternate forward-
looking specification of the rule that incorporates GDP and GDP deflator (inflation) forecasts 
obtained from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). A panel 
regression model, of the following specification is used: 
𝐷_𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑘∗ = 𝑥𝑘𝑘′ 𝛽 + 𝜀𝑘 ,                                                              (6) 
Where D_TAYLORt refers to the deviation from the benchmark Taylor rule following the 
FOMC decision at meeting t, 𝑥𝑘𝑘is a matrix containing FOMC member characteristics, and 
macroeconomic controls, as independent variables, and β is a vector of parameter estimates. 
Empirical results for current period Taylor Rule are presented in columns 1 & 2 of Table 4. 
The highly significant, and positive, constant indicates that on average the FOMC has preferred to 
err on the side of caution and maintained monetary policy above the level suggested by the Taylor 
Rule. The tenure of the Chair and FOMC members, along with time-served within the Federal 
Reserve System appear to have contrasting influences on monetary policy. As the length of time 
the Chair has been in position increases, deviations from the Taylor Rule are allowed to become 
more negative, again consistent with the notion that once the Chair has established inflation 
fighting credentials it is possible for more expansionary monetary policy than otherwise; a similar 
argument may be presented to explain the negative and significant coefficient for appointees to 
the FOMC (FOMC_APPT). Supportive of Gӧhlmann and Vaubel (2007), as the time-served on the 
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central bank staff increases there is a greater preference for lower levels of inflation, in this case 
exhibited by monetary policy that is tighter than that suggested by the Taylor Rule.  
<Insert Table 4> 
 
Consistent with Chappell et al. (1993), FOMC members nominated by a Republican 
President favour tighter monetary policy, demonstrated by the positive and significant coefficient 
of P_PARTY. The well-defined, negative co-efficient for the GREENSPAN (indicating Alan 
Greenspan was Chair at the time of the specific meeting) and BERNANKE  (indicating Ben 
Bernanke was Chair at the time of the specific meeting) and VCHAIR dummies reflect the 
observation that in more recent times (under the stewardship of Ben Bernanke as Chair, and 
Timothy Geithner as Vice-Chair) the Fed Funds Target has been kept well below that suggested 
by the Taylor Rule. There seems to be a slight predilection for female FOMC members 
(GENDER), and (consistent with Havrilesky and Gildea, 1995; Chappell and McGregor, 2000), 
Governors (BOG) to prefer easier policy than Federal Reserve Presidents, however age, prior 
work experience, and education level, do not appear to play a role in explaining policy deviations 
from the Taylor Rule. The well-defined, negative, lagged dependent variable indicates that the 
FOMC acts to correct prior deviations from the Taylor Rule. The qualitative implications of our 
results are robust to the alternate, forward-looking, Taylor Rule specification presented in 
columns 3 & 4 of Table 4.   
 
Dissent from the FOMC Decision 
 So far the empirical analysis has focused on the outcome of FOMC decisions and how the 
decision might deviate from the nominal interest rate suggested by the Taylor Rule. We now 
attempt to gain an understanding into the factors which may lead to a FOMC member dissenting 
from the group decision. We consider a series of binary11 logit panel models of the form: 
                                                             
11 An alternative approach would be to use an ordered logit framework. We use the binary logit framework 
as it provides greater simplicity, and by splitting the analysis of the decision into a two-stage process, allows 
for an understanding of the factors behinds the particular dissent decision (e.g. prefer easier policy, prefer 
tighter policy, or prefer different language). In addition, using ordered logit creates an issue in determining 
the appropriate order of choices to use. For example, we could assign “decision to dissent in favour of easier 
policy” as 0, “no dissent” as 1, and “dissent in favour of tighter policy as 2. However, this ordering is 
questionable and creates problems with interpretation. In addition, there is no satisfactory way to include 




𝑍𝑘𝑘∗ = 𝑥𝑘𝑘′ 𝛽 + 𝜀𝑘𝑘 , 
𝑍𝑘𝑘 = 0          if 𝑍𝑘𝑘∗ ≤ 𝛾1 , 
𝑍𝑘𝑘 = +1       if 𝑍𝑘𝑘∗ > 𝛾1 
Where 𝑍𝑘𝑘∗ is a stacked vector of 0s and +1s corresponding to an individual FOMC member’s 
decision to dissent from the group decision, 𝑥𝑘𝑘is a matrix containing FOMC member 
characteristics and macroeconomic controls, as independent variables, and β is a vector of 
parameter estimates. A similar specification with the member’s expressed preference for tighter or 
easier policy (or different policy language) as the decision variable allows for a more nuanced 
examination of the issue of dissent. 
<Insert Table 5> 
 Maximum likelihood estimates for the specified model are presented in Table 5. Columns 
1 and 2 present the estimates for FOMC member dissent from the policy decision. Contrary to 
Havrilesky and Gildea (1992) working in academia significantly increases the likelihood of 
dissent, while working in Government or industry has no significant impact. The length of time 
since joining the Fed also increases the likelihood of dissent, perhaps explained by longer-serving 
Fed members having a greater level of support inside the institute and so been more comfortable 
in registering a dissenting vote. The probability of dissent declines as the tenure of the Chair 
increases, consistent with Krause (1994) and Chappell et al. (2004) who note that it is possible the 
Chair has the power to influence decisions and this may increase over time. El-Shagi and Jung 
(2015) also note that a strong Chair (such as Greenspan) may be able to enforce consent. The 
lagged dependent variable (column 2) demonstrates that there is some persistence in the 
propensity to dissent; i.e. a FOMC member dissenting in one meeting is more likely to dissent in 
the following meeting. 
The remaining columns of Table 5 explore the decision to dissent further, focusing on 
dissent in favour of tighter monetary policy (column 3), easier monetary policy (column 4), and a 
preference for different language (column 5). Whilst the tendency for Governors to ease 
identified by Chappell and McGregor (2000) is not confirmed, there is at least evidence that a 
Governor would be significantly less likely to prefer tighter monetary policy. Consistent with the 




Reserve staff prefer tighter monetary policy (and lower inflation rates). As a Chair is in place for a 
longer period the probability of dissent for tighter policy decreases (there is no significant impact 
on easier policy choices), this suggests that FOMC members become less concerned about 
inflation-fighting credentials as the Chair gains experience in the role. There is also less likely to 
be dissent in terms of monetary policy language as the tenure of the Chair increases, perhaps as 
the other FOMC members become more comfortable with the policy suggestions of the Chair. 
Academics and, to a lower degree of significance, those with experience in the government are 
more likely to dissent in favour of easier monetary policy. Macroeconomic variables significantly 
increase the likelihood of dissent in favour of easier policy, and for different language, this is 
likely because FOMC members have different opinions as to the potential for the economic state 
to persist. Finally, the coefficient for the lagged dependent variable provides clear evidence that 
FOMC members continue to dissent once they have made the initial decision to do so. 
5. Robustness Tests 
Evolving monetary policy regime 
So far, the analysis has effectively assumed that the monetary policy regime has remained 
constant throughout the sample period. It is possible that this is not the case, and that the 
determinants of policy decisions changed as the regime evolved. We investigate this by splitting 
our sample. In the first instance, we have the sample of meetings that occur during the period we 
denote as the Great Moderation; this runs from January 1982 – August 200712. Secondly, we have 
the sample of meetings within the period of the Great Recession & aftermath (or Global Financial 
Crisis), which starts in August 200713 with strain in mortgage markets and runs until the end of 
our sample period. While Clark (2009) suggests this period is merely a temporary period of high 
volatility, and not necessarily a definitive end to the Great Moderation, we include this period for 
as it witnessed a period of extraordinary monetary policy actions. During this period, the Fed 
Funds target rate moved close to zero, large scale asset purchases were undertaken, and 
quantitative easing introduced. Given such actions, it is naturally of particular interest to 
investigate whether our reported results remain relevant under such circumstances. Finally, we 
                                                             
12 This timeline is noted by the Federal Reserve History 
(http://www.federalreservehistory.org/Events/DetailView/65)  
13 Again, this follows the suggestion of the Federal Reserve History. Our results are qualitatively robust to 




consider a third period of zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) which starts following the December 
2008 meeting, when the Fed funds target rate reached the zero lower bound. The target rate 
remained at this lower bound until the end of the sample period. We note the significant overlap 
with the second sub-sample but still feel this sample is worth considering given the nature of 
monetary policy decisions (no-change) throughout. 
During the latter two sample periods, to achieve their monetary policy goals, the FOMC 
implemented two forms of unconventional policy. First, the use of forward guidance, whereby 
the FOMC attempted to reduce, and stabilise, longer-term interest rates by publically committing 
to maintaining the policy rate close to zero for an extended period of time. Evidence suggests this 
may have been ineffective in driving economic recovery (e.g. Anderson and Hoffman, 2010; Kool 
and Thornton, 2012). Second, the FOMC introduced Quantitative Easing (QE), where longer-
term assets were purchased, in order to reduce long-term rates. Immediately following the 
announcement of Lehman’s demise, primary credit borrowing and Term Auction Facilities (TAF) 
lending increased markedly. Evidence shows that these actions were appropriate (Thornton; 2010, 
2012). The effectiveness of these actions is reflected in risk spreads, where both short- and long-
term spreads, which had increased dramatically following Lehman’s announcement, declined 
markedly. These actions indicate that even after the Fed Fund target rate reached the zero lower-
bound the FOMC remained aggressive in its policy actions. The effectiveness of monetary policy 
actions comes through the expectations effect, which seems to be particularly important when the 
FOMC’s actions occur at a time when there are significant signs that financial markets need 
stabilizing mechanisms.  
Overall, the literature provides supportive evidence that monetary policy decisions after the 
crisis, involving asset purchases, were most effective at stimulating the economy when they work 
in concert with expectations of sustained easy conventional monetary policy (Chen et al., 2012; 
Chung et al., 2012). Based on the particular issues concerning the policy decisions of the FOMC 
during the post-crisis period, we expect that the demographic drivers, identified as significant in 
the previous sections of the empirical analysis, will not play a substantial (if any) role in 
influencing monetary policy decisions; whether this is manifested through deviations of policy 
from a benchmark Taylor rule or dissents by individuals from the committee decision. 
Therefore, we repeat our earlier analysis with the sample disaggregated into the three sub-
periods already explained. Table 6 presents estimates for coefficients of the ordered logit 
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regression specified in equation (5). Recall that for the whole sample period the member 
characteristics that had a significant effect on the FOMC decision where government service 
(GOVT) and tenure of the Chair (CHAIR_TIME). Disaggregating the sample shows that the same 
two characteristics still have a significant influence, and in the same direction, on the decision 
across all sub-periods. No other characteristics have an impact on the decision in the period 
subsequent to the Great Recession. Interestingly, during the Great Moderation, political party at 
time of Fed appointment, length of service within the Federal Reserve, and industry experience 
influence FOMC decisions, but this ceases to be the case in the subsequent periods. 
Macroeconomic variables influence the decision across all sample periods, but the direction of the 
relationship changes during the Great Recession; likely as members’ priority shifts away from 
inflation fighting. 
<Insert Table 6> 
Table 7 presents estimates for coefficients for the regression specified in equation (6), with 
the sample again disaggregated into three sub-periods.  In the period prior to the Great Recession, 
deviations from the Taylor Rule are explained in much the same way as that highlighted earlier, 
and is also consistent with the evidence provided in Table 6. Appointments during a Republican 
Presidency and with longer tenure within the Federal Reserve System will tend to result in 
tighter policy than implied by the Taylor Rule (positive deviations), while increasing the tenure 
of the Chair, and appointment to the FOMC, will result in easier policy than is suggested 
(negative deviations). Deviations from the Taylor Rule tended to be more negative during 
Greenspan’s tenure as Chair, then in the period of Volcker’s tenure. The deviation was even 
greater for the brief part of the Great Moderation for which Bernanke was Chair14. 
<Insert Table 7> 
In contrast, the period following the onset of the Great Recession produces very different 
results. First, using current period inputs, the constant is significantly negative, indicating that 
that monetary policy would be easier than that implied by the Taylor Rule, all else held constant. 
This compares with the Great Moderation period when the constant was significant and positive. 
Importantly, the Great Recession period sees Academic background become a significant factor on 
                                                             
14 No GREENSPAN or BERNANKE dummy variable is included for the period subsequent to the Great 
Moderation as Bernanke was Chair for the whole period. 
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deviations from the Taylor Rule, with the implication that a greater number of academics within 
the FOMC would result in easier policy during this period (more negative deviations). This is 
consistent with academic members of the FOMC, such as Bernanke (1983, 2004), spending part of 
their career analysing policy during the Great Depression and seeking to prevent a repeat by 
choosing accommodative policy. The only other FOMC member characteristic that has any 
significance is that of the time spent in situ by the Chair where the relationship is negative and 
significant, as it is for the whole sample; that is the effect of the Chair’s tenure appears to be 
consistent throughout the sample. 
<Insert Table 8> 
Disaggregating the data in a similar fashion also allows for further inspection of the decision 
to dissent from the vote, with the results reported in Table 8. The influences of the identified 
factors on dissent from the majority vote indicate that there are some important differences. First, 
whereas tenure of the Chair is significant in the overall sample, and during the Great Moderation, 
this is no longer the case following the start of the Great Recession. Similarly, while length of 
time at the Fed significantly increases the likelihood of dissent during the Great Moderation, it 
has no significant effect in subsequent periods. Industry (Government) experience significantly 
increases (decreases) the likelihood of dissent during the Great Moderation, but the effect is 
reversed (although not well-defined) in the Great Recession period. In addition, Governors are 
more likely to dissent in the Great Recession. The lagged dependent variable is positive and 
significant in all sub-periods, indicating that having dissented at one vote, there is an increased 
likelihood of the member dissenting at the following vote.  
We note that the tenure of Alan Greenspan (19-years), was significantly longer than that of 
either his predecessor, Paul Volcker (8-years), or his successor, Ben Bernanke (8-years), and also 
that the issues faced by each Chair was different. For instance, Volcker had to grapple with 
extremely high inflation, while Bernanke encountered a major financial crisis. This raises 
potential issues with the interpretation of variables relating to the tenure of the Chair. Analysing 
different sub-periods of the sample allows us to at least consider whether the effect was consistent 
across time. The empirical evidence does seem to suggest that the tenure of the Chair does have a 
consistent, and well-defined, effect on FOMC decisions. 
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To summarize, the financial crisis that brought an end to the Great Moderation precipitated 
a change in the characteristics of FOMC members that influenced both the stance of monetary 
policy relative to a benchmark rule, and the propensity of individual members to dissent from 
majority vote. This coincided with a period of unconventional monetary policy with the Fed 
Funds target rate remaining close to zero for a prolonged period, and suggests that FOMC 
decision-making behaviour has adapted to circumstance. 
Defining member characteristics 
Many of the FOMC members have experience in more than one sector (ACADEMIC, 
GOVT, INDUSTRY) prior to appointment to the Fed. It possible that the decisions made by a 
member who has wider experience (for instance, as both an academic and in industry) are 
different to those with more narrow experience (in just one sector). We add interaction terms to 
each of our model specifications in order to examine this possibility. We also test whether the 
specification of EDUCATION is appropriate, introducing distinct dummy variables indicating an 
individual members highest level of education (since all members have a BACHELORS, the 
dummy variables chosen are MASTERS and DOCTORATE). Empirical results are presented 
within the Appendix (Appendix 1, Appendix 2, Appendix 3).  
The main impact of changing this specification appears to lie in the member characteristics 
affecting the FOMC decision (Appendix 1) rather than deviations from the Taylor Rule or dissent. 
Two points are noted. First, the negative coefficient for EDUCATION shown in Column 1 of 
Table 3 appears to be due to DOCTORAL level education (although this effect disappears once 
macroeconomic variables are added). Second, the negative coefficient for FOMC members with 
government background noted in Table 3 is specific to those FOMC members who have 
experience in both academia and government. In all other cases, the interaction terms are not 
significant. 
In our empirical analysis we introduced a dummy variable to indicate political partisanship 
along the lines of Chappell et al. (1993). Whereas that paper assigned political status only to 
members of the Board of Governors, we also apply the variable to presidents of the Federal 
Reserve districts. It is therefore useful to understand whether this decision has an impact on our 
reported results, and so we re-run our analysis. We find that results are qualitatively similar to 
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that found with our original specification (for instance Appendix 1, Model 4), and so do not 
present the results here.   
6. Conclusions 
This paper has attempted to examine the influence of FOMC member characteristics on 
the monetary policy decision making process. We utilise a novel dataset to examine FOMC 
decisions, the effectiveness of those decisions, and individual dissent from the Committee 
decision, over the period July 1979 – February 2014. 
Our empirical results show that education, age, and, to a lesser extent, work experience 
are not important in understanding the FOMC decision-making process; this is contrary to the 
extant literature for the FOMC (e.g. Chappell at al., 1995; Havrilesky and Gildea, 1995) but 
consistent with the work on the monetary policy committee of the Bank of England conducted by 
Harris et al. (2011). Instead, our results point to the importance of time spent within the Federal 
Reserve System, on the FOMC itself, and the influence of the Chair in shaping the decision-
making process. Taken together, the results suggest that once the FOMC, and it’s Chair, has 
established credibility to fight inflation, it is possible to target other objectives for monetary 
policy as set out in the Federal Reserve Act, for example “maximum employment”.   
Our findings also seem to be consistent with the extant literature (e.g. Chappell et al., 
2004) in emphasising the importance of the FOMC Chair in influencing decisions; as tenure 
increases the likelihood of interest rate cuts grows, as does the prospect of policy being easier than 
that suggested by the Taylor Rule, while the instances of dissent from FOMC members declines. 
Disaggregating the data, into two sub-samples, reveals that the FOMC decision-making behaviour 
altered during the period of unconventional monetary policy that following the financial crisis of 
2008. 
The implications associated with our empirical results could be that economic agents and 
(financial) markets across the economy can increase their capacity to more accurately utilize the 
information disseminated from the central bank. This would significantly reduce the uncertainty 
associated with monetary policy decisions enable both economic agents and markets to attach the 
correct weight to the information emanating from monetary policy decisions. This is important 




Building on the results of this paper, a key direction for future research would be to 
explore the predictive power of our modelling approach both when committee members care and 
do not about their reputation. Such reputational concerns can connect current monetary policy 
decisions to previous decisions, introducing a causal link from current to future policy choices. 
Therefore, empirically investigating this methodological strand is expected to be a key issue that 
is ripe for future research.  It would be also highly interesting to extend the empirical model to 
other central banks, such as the Bank of England and the European Central Bank monetary policy 
committees. 
<Insert Appendix 1> 
<Insert Appendix 2> 
<Insert Appendix 3> 
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Panel A: Variables Describing FOMC Members' Characteristics
Variable Definition
AGE Age (in years) of member at time of meeting
GENDER Dummy variable equal to 1 if the member is female; otherwise equal to zero.
EDUCATION Dummy variable equal to 2 if the member has a Ph.D. degree, 1 if the member has a MA degree; otherwise equal to zero.
MASTERS Dummy variable equal to 1 if the member's higest level of education is a Masters degree; otherwise equal to zero.
DOCTORATE Dummy variable equal to 1 if the member's higest level of education is a Doctorate; otherwise equal to zero.
ACADEMIC Dummy variable equal to 1 if the member has work experience as an academic; otherwise equal to zero.
GOVT Dummy variable equal to 1 if the member has work experience in government; otherwise equal to zero.
INDUSTRY Dummy variable equal to 1 if the member has work experience in industry; otherwise equal to zero.
P_PARTY Dummy variable equal to 1 if the member was appointed by a Republican administration; otherwise equal to zero.
BOG Dummy variable equal to 1 if the member is appointed to the Federal Reserve Board of Governors; otherwise equal to zero.
CHAIR Dummy variable equal to 1 if the member was Chair of the FOMC at given meeting; otherwise equal to zero.
VICE_CHAIR Dummy variable equal to 1 if the member was Vice-Chair of the FOMC at given meeting; otherwise equal to zero.
D_CHAIR Variable indicating FOMC Chair at time of meeting; 0 = Volcker, 1 = Greenspan, 2 = Bernanke
GREENSPAN Dummy variable equal to 1 if Alan Greenspan was Chair of the FOMC at given meeting; otherwise equal to zero.
BERNANKE Dummy variable equal to 1 if Ben Bernanke was Chair of the FOMC at given meeting; otherwise equal to zero.
D_VCHAIR Variable indicating FOMC Vice-Chair at time of meeting; 0 = Solomon, 1 = Corrigan, 2 = McDonough, 3 = Geithner, 4 = Dudley
FOMC_APPT
Years since member was appointed to role on Board of Governors or senior Federal Reserve position (e.g. President of Federal R
that entitled member to be part of FOMC.
FED_JOIN Years since member first joined the Federal Reserve system in any capacity.
CHAIR_TIME Years since current FOMC Chair was appointed.
Panel B: Variables Describing Decision Characteristics
Variable Definition
DEC_2 Dummy variable equal to 1 if the Fed Funds target was changed at the meeting; otherwise equal to zero.
DEC_3
Ordered decision variable equal to -1 if the Fed Funds target was decreased at the meeting, +1 if the Fed Funds target was increa
the meeting; otherwise equal to zero.
DISSENT Dummy variable equal to 1 if the member dissented from the overall decision at the meeting; otherwise equal to zero.
TIGHTER
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the member preferred less expansive (tighter) monetary policy than decided by the FOMC; otherw
equal to zero.
EASIER
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the member preferred more expansive (easier) monetary policy than decided by the FOMC; other
equal to zero.
LANGUAGE Dummy variable equal to 1 if the member dissented on grounds of language in policy statement; otherwise equal to zero.
Panel C: Variables Describing Macroeconomic Conditions
Variable Definition
FF_TARGET Fed Fund Target rate resulting from meeting decision. If a specific target is not provided then the mid-point of the target range 
TAYLOR
Benchmark nominal interest rate determined by Taylor rule. Calculated as per Taylor (1993), with output measured by the loga
real GDP, the logarithm of potential output measured by the  5-year rolling average of real GDP, the rate of inflation measured 
GDP deflator, the desired rate of inflation set equal to 2%, the assumed equilibrium real interest rate equal to 2%. Robustness ch
consider an alternate version replacing current levels of growth and inflation with estimates obtained from the OECD.
D_TAYLOR Difference between Fed Fund Target and 'optimal' rate determined by the Taylor Rule.
GDP Annualized Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth as per the release prior to the FOMC meeting.
INFLATION Rate of change in the GDP Deflator (Annualized) as per the release prior to the FOMC meeting.
YLD_CURVE Slope of yield curve at time of meeting. Calculated using 1-year and 10-year Treasury yields.
Note:  This table describes the main variables used within the empirical framework of this paper.
Table	2
Summary Statistics
Panel A: Whole Sample MEAN ST. DEV MIN MAX
FF_TARGET 5.75 4.41 0.125 19.50
TAYLOR (Current) 5.69 3.12 -0.75 15.20
D_TAYLOR (Current) 0.06 2.48 -5.53 6.34
TAYLOR (Forward-Looking) 5.71 3.10 0.92 15.26
D_TAYLOR (Forward-Looking) 0.04 3.04 -6.25 9.64
AGE 56.79 7.80 35.98 79.96
FED_JOIN 16.21 12.80 0.00 45.00
FOMC_APPT 5.53 4.49 0.00 23.76
CHAIR_TIME 6.98 5.44 0.00 19.47
Panel B: Mean values under 
different FOMC Chair Overall Volcker Greenspan Bernanke
EDUCATION 1.61 1.44 1.67 1.65
GENDER 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.24
ACADEMIC 0.47 0.52 0.44 0.52
GOVT 0.94 0.95 0.93 0.97
INDUSTRY 0.63 0.66 0.71 0.40
P_PARTY 0.56 0.21 0.70 0.59
FF_TARGET 5.75 11.83 4.81 1.50
D_TAYLOR (Current) 0.06 1.80 0.27 -2.41
D_TAYLOR (Forward-Looking) 0.04 2.17 0.04 -2.30
Panel C: Transition Table of FOMC Decisions
DEC_3 Cut (-1) No-Change (0) Hike (+1)
Cut (-1) 55.6 36.48 7.92
No-Change (0) 16.2 71.92 11.87
Hike (+1) 9.44 27.29 63.27
Total 24.22 53.35 22.43
Note:  This table provides summary statistics for the main variables used in this study. 
FF_TARGET  is the Fed Funds Target rate decided at the FOMC meeting, TAYLOR  is the 
benchmark nominal interest rate calculated using the Taylor Rule (utilising both current 
period and forward-looking growth and inflation data), and D_TAYLOR  refers to 
deviations of the FF_TARGET from this benchmark rate. AGE  is the age (in years) of the 
FOMC member while EDUCATION  and GENDER  (0 = M, 1 = F) are dummy variables 
reflecting other FOMC member characteristics. ACADEMIC , GOVT , and INDUSTRY 
are dummy variables indicating prior work experience of the FOMC member, and 
P_PARTY  is a dummy variable indicating the party of the President nominating the 
member to the FOMC (0 = Democrat, 1 = Republican). Panel B denotes how the mean of 
relevant variables has changed over time. Panel C is a transition table of FOMC decisions 
indicating the proportion of occasions on which one choice of ordered monetary policy 
decision (to cut, leave rates unchanged, or hike rates) has followed another.
Table	3




AGE -0.001 0.004 -0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
EDUCATION -0.180 *** -0.080 -0.046
(0.068) (0.070) (0.070)
P_PARTY -0.260 *** 0.000 0.074
(0.072) (0.075) (0.076)
GENDER 0.026 0.145 0.046
(0.098) (0.101) (0.102)
ACADEMIC 0.102 0.024 0.013
(0.078) (0.080) (0.081)
GOVT -0.352 ** -0.464 *** -0.412 **
(0.157) (0.162) (0.163)
INDUSTRY 0.018 -0.208 ** -0.116
(0.080) (0.083) (0.084)
BOG -0.052 0.046 0.005
(0.078) (0.079) (0.080)
FOMC_APPT -0.008 -0.006 -0.006
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
FED_JOIN 0.008 ** 0.002 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
CHAIR_TIME -0.020 *** -0.031 *** -0.047 ***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
GDP 0.227 *** 0.087 ***
(0.018) (0.027)
INFLATION 0.143 *** 0.806 ***
(0.025) (0.140)




γ1 -1.912 -0.110 -0.212
(0.482) (0.781) (0.709)
γ2 0.540 2.671 2.562
(0.480) (0.784) (0.711)
σ2u 0.084 0.328 0.246
(0.035) (0.079) (0.070)
Obs. 3248 3248 3027
Log-likelihood -3261 -3032 -3029
LR Test v ologit 14.93 95.17 53.27
Wald Chi2 33.42 391.44 404.74
Note:  This table presents the estimates for the ordered logit model specified 
in eq.(1). The dependent variable is the FOMC decision at time t  and is 
assumed to be a ordered choice to decrease (-1), leave-unchanged (0) or 
increase (+1) the Fed Funds target rate. γ1 and γ2 refer to the cut-points for 
each decision. Cluster robust standard errors (Rogers, 1993) are reported in 
parantheses. Sample period: August 1979 - February 2014.
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Table	4
Panel Regression: Factors explaining policy deviations from Taylor Rule
Dependent Variable: Deviation 
from Taylor Rule
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 10.944 *** 11.238 *** 9.079 *** 10.649 ***
(0.474) (0.456) (0.885) (0.380)
AGE -0.007 -0.007 -0.021 -0.004
(0.007) (0.006) (0.015) (0.005)
EDUCATION 0.067 0.058 0.223 0.013
(0.085) (0.087) (0.216) (0.083)
P_PARTY 0.264 *** 0.185 ** 0.836 *** 0.169 **
(0.101) (0.088) (0.214) (0.076)
GENDER -0.196 * -0.169 * -0.236 -0.096
(0.104) (0.088) (0.222) (0.073)
ACADEMIC 0.021 0.009 0.005 0.030
(0.106) (0.093) (0.232) (0.091)
GOVT 0.109 0.127 0.482 0.085
(0.130) (0.111) (0.302) (0.127)
INDUSTRY 0.146 0.124 0.269 0.121
(0.111) (0.104) (0.234) (0.103)
BOG -0.168 * -0.146 * -0.380 ** -0.075 **
(0.089) (0.078) (0.188) (0.031)
FOMC_APPT -0.022 ** -0.022 ** -0.023 *** -0.020 **
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
FED_JOIN 0.012 *** 0.011 *** 0.014 *** 0.010 **
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
CHAIR_TIME -0.146 *** -0.143 *** -0.104 *** -0.153 ***
(0.017) (0.014) (0.020) (0.015)
GREENSPAN -2.183 *** -2.318 *** -1.802 *** -2.345 ***
(0.193) (0.201) (0.337) (0.183)
BERNANKE -4.431 *** -4.345 *** -2.910 *** -4.311 ***
(0.459) (0.402) (0.755) (0.413)
D_VCHAIR -0.871 *** -0.874 *** -1.749 *** -0.665 ***
(0.088) (0.082) (0.175) (0.090)
GDP -0.233 *** -0.146 *** -0.097 *** -0.122 ***
(0.026) (0.016) (0.031) (0.021)
INFLATION -1.254 *** -0.692 *** -0.967 *** -0.743 ***
(0.044) (0.151) (0.077) (0.069)
YLD_CURVE -1.451 *** -1.431 *** -1.550 *** -1.285 ***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.046) (0.029)
Lag(D_TAYLOR) -0.378 *** -1.249 ***
(0.111) (0.041)
σu 0.364 0.267 0.601 0.315
σe 1.016 0.984 1.807 1.076
ρ 0.113 0.069 0.100 0.079
R2 0.819 0.830 0.594 0.865
within 0.682 0.694 0.435 0.793
between 0.942 0.951 0.792 0.954
Obs 3248 3027 3248 3027
Wald 1261 1912 3657 1438
Note:  This table presents the estimates for the ordinary least squares model specified in eq.(2). The dependent variable is 
the deviation of the Fed Funds Target from the benchmark Taylor rule (calculated by subtracting the nominal benchmark 
rate from the Fed Funds Target rate in place following the FOMC decision) at time t . Columns (1) and (2) use a Taylor 
Rule calculated on the basis of current period (GDP) growth and (GDP deflator) inflation, while columns (3) and (4) use 
forecasts for growth and inflation obtained from the OECD. Cluster robust standard errors (Rogers, 1993) are reported in 
parantheses. Sample period: August 1979 - February 2014. 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Table	5
Dissent from FOMC Vote
Tighter Easier Language
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant -25.00 -23.57 -6.769 ** -4.601 * -9.368 *
(38.24) (27.64) (2.904) (2.428) (4.583)
AGE -0.014 -0.009 -0.066 -0.047 -0.025
(0.039) (0.033) (0.049) (0.041) (0.074)
EDUCATION -0.245 -0.057 0.038 -0.175 -0.498
(0.449) (0.383) (0.545) (0.518) (0.849)
P_PARTY 0.631 0.500 0.281 0.955 0.557
(0.502) (0.431) (0.632) (0.572) (1.019)
GENDER 0.024 -0.010 -1.885 0.650 -0.272
(0.698) (0.592) (1.128) (0.668) (1.585)
ACADEMIC 1.249 ** 1.011 ** 0.637 1.039 * 0.438
(0.568) (0.478) (0.685) (0.626) (1.029)
GOVT 1.97 1.83 -0.265 0.723 * 0.245
(3.824) (2.764) (0.168) (0.380) (0.185)
INDUSTRY 0.930 * 0.715 1.046 -0.143 -0.388
(0.547) (0.468) (0.729) (0.554) (1.086)
BOG 0.804 0.853 * -1.720 ** -0.293 2.004 *
(0.537) (0.451) (0.686) (0.550) (1.180)
FOMC_APPT -0.006 -0.007 -0.100 -0.023 0.319 **
(0.047) (0.042) (0.057) (0.064) (0.138)
FED_JOIN 0.051 ** 0.039 * 0.052 * 0.013 -0.116
(0.024) (0.020) (0.030) (0.024) (0.082)
CHAIR_TIME -0.080 *** -0.064 ** -0.086 ** -0.006 -0.070 ***
(0.026) (0.027) (0.034) (0.046) (0.017)
GDP 0.060 0.072 0.022 0.217 *** 0.173
(0.042) (0.045) (0.057) (0.078) (0.133)
INFLATION 0.127 * 0.093 0.015 0.227 * 0.193
(0.073) (0.075) (0.097) (0.124) (0.284)
YLD_CURVE 0.110 0.066 0.069 -0.036 1.106 ***
(0.084) (0.089) (0.112) (0.151) (0.319)
Lag(Dependent) 1.410 *** 1.663 *** 0.599 * 2.615 ***
(0.196) (0.231) (0.361) (0.575)
ln(σ2v) 1.007 0.554 1.271 0.455 1.358
(0.275) (0.324) (0.353) (0.205) (0.370)
σv 1.654 1.319 1.884 1.258 1.972
(0.227) (0.214) (0.334) (0.316) (0.720)
ρ 0.454 0.346 0.520 0.324 0.542
(0.068) (0.073) (0.088) (0.110) (0.181)
Likelihood-ratio 172.52 65.69 89.14 18.58 14.58
 Log likelihood -665.66 -598.46 -400.19 -246.88 -95.42
Wald (χ2,14) 29.35 86.15 85.93 22.42 50.60
Obs. 3248 3027 3027 3027 3027
Dissent from vote outcome
Note:  This table presents the estimates for the logit model specified in eq.(3). The dependent variable is a choice 
variable relating to the decision made by individual FOMC member k  at meeting t . Panel A relates to the choice to 
dissent. In columns (1) and (2) the dependent variable is the choice to dissent (1) or not (0). Panel B relates to the 
reasons why a FOMC member would dissent from the committee decision. In column (3) the choice is dissent in 
favour of tighter monetary policy than decided by the FOMC as whole (1) or not. In column (4) the choice is dissent 
in favour of easier monetary policy (1) or not (0). Column (5) reflects a choice between dissent on the grounds of 
language used (1) or not (0).  Cluster robust standard errors (Rogers, 1993) are reported in parantheses. Sample 
period: August 1979 - February 2014.
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Panel A Panel B
Table	6
Ordered Logit: Factors influencing the FOMC Decision for Disaggregated Sample







AGE -0.001 0.002 -0.002
(0.016) (0.006) (0.001)
EDUCATION -0.082 0.000 0.022
(0.202) (0.093) (0.022)
P_PARTY 0.668 *** -0.021 -0.005
(0.221) (0.072) (0.173)
GENDER -0.091 0.035 0.005
(0.306) (0.083) (0.016)
ACADEMIC 0.090 0.055 -0.205
(0.252) (0.080) (0.130)
GOVT -1.091 ** -0.357 ** -0.431 ***
(0.449) (0.178) (0.119)
INDUSTRY -0.526 ** 0.051 0.062
(0.239) (0.075) (0.078)
BOG -0.123 0.020 0.031
(0.232) (0.084) (0.023)
FOMC_APPT 0.056 ** -0.004 -0.004 **
(0.022) (0.007) (0.002)
FED_JOIN -0.006 0.002 0.003 **
(0.010) (0.004) (0.001)
CHAIR_TIME 0.052 *** 0.076 *** 0.040 ***
(0.013) (0.010) (0.007)
GDP 0.675 *** -0.048 *** -0.016
(0.066) (0.014) (0.011)
INFLATION 1.416 *** -0.416 *** -0.192 ***
(0.394) (0.060) (0.039)
YLD_CURVE -0.299 *** 0.062 *** 0.055 ***
(0.051) (0.012) (0.014)
Lag(D_TAYLOR) -0.382 0.163 *** 0.076 ***
(0.245) (0.032) (0.022)
γ1 -1.639 -1.107 1.107
(1.075) (1.289) (1.289)
γ2 4.459 3.889 3.889
(1.082) (1.293) (1.293)
σ2u 0.503 0.296 0.296
(0.159) (0.072) (0.072)
Obs. 2337 572 442
Log-likelihood -2119 -3028 -3028
LR Test v ologit 57.75 85.83 85.83
Wald Chi2 473.49 398.38 398.38
Note:  This table presents the estimates for the ordered logit model specified in eq.(1). 
Thedependent variable is the FOMC decision at time t  and is assumed to be a ordered 
choice to decrease (-1), leave-unchanged (0) or increase (+1) the Fed Funds target rate.  
The sample is disaggregated into periods representing the Great Moderation, the Great 
Recession, and the period of zero interest rate policy (ZIRP). Following the Federal 
Reserve, the Great Moderation is defined as the period January 1982 - July 2007, the 
Great Recession as August 2007 - January 2013, and ZIRP is defined as December 2008 
(when the Fed Funds rate reached the zero-bound) until the end of the sample period. 
γ1 and γ2 refer to the cut-points for each decision. Cluster robust standard errors 
(Rogers, 1993) are reported in parantheses. Sample period: January 1982 - February 
2014.
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively
Table	7
Panel Regression: Factors explaining policy deviations from Taylor Rule for disaggregated sample
Dependent Variable: 











Constant 9.184 *** -10.528 *** -0.806 *** 9.635 *** -16.888 *** -4.356 ***
(0.467) (0.722) (0.072) (0.401) (0.628) (0.627)
AGE -0.002 -0.005 -0.004 -0.002 -0.009 ** -0.003
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
EDUCATION 0.062 0.075 0.011 * -0.025 0.060 0.015
(0.072) (0.154) (0.006) (0.059) (0.079) (0.035)
P_PARTY 0.171 *** -0.112 -0.003 0.205 *** -0.070 -0.005
(0.065) (0.108) (0.005) (0.058) (0.047) (0.020)
GENDER -0.048 -0.106 -0.011 * -0.033 -0.032 -0.031 *
(0.071) (0.088) (0.006) (0.052) (0.047) (0.016)
ACADEMIC 0.052 -0.048 -0.023 *** 0.064 -0.030 -0.012 ***
(0.074) (0.149) (0.006) (0.054) (0.093) (0.054)
GOVT 0.216 -0.075 -0.007 -0.023 -0.292 ** -0.188 ***
(0.173) (0.224) (0.011) (0.133) (0.130) (0.078)
INDUSTRY 0.102 * -0.090 -0.015 * -0.008 -0.052 -0.017
(0.060) (0.133) (0.008) (0.051) (0.071) (0.042)
BOG -0.001 -0.033 -0.009 -0.027 -0.059 -0.001
(0.057) (0.116) (0.006) (0.049) (0.068) (0.036)
FOMC_APPT -0.016 ** -0.008 -0.001 -0.011 -0.004 -0.001
(0.008) (0.011) (0.001) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002)
FED_JOIN 0.007 *** -0.004 0.009 * 0.005 ** 0.006 0.002
(0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003)
CHAIR_TIME -0.143 *** -0.249 *** -0.178 *** -0.130 *** -0.109 *** -0.041 ***
(0.009) (0.060) (0.003) (0.006) (0.029) (0.013)
GREENSPAN -1.924 *** -1.934 ***
(0.127) (0.120)
BERNANKE -4.396 *** -4.105 ***
(0.266) (0.203)
D_VCHAIR -0.816 *** -1.664 *** -0.167 *** -0.931 *** -3.914 *** -1.167 ***
(0.086) (0.272) (0.011) (0.042) (0.202) (0.171)
GDP -0.123 *** -0.129 *** -0.481 *** -0.189 *** -0.028 -0.021 *
(0.016) (0.031) (0.002) (0.024) (0.019) (0.013)
INFLATION -0.766 *** -1.226 *** -1.677 *** 1.085 *** -0.733 *** -0.277 ***
(0.070) (0.123) (0.019) (0.093) (0.058) (0.038)
YLD_C -1.488 *** -0.863 *** -0.144 *** -1.388 *** -0.667 *** -0.184 ***
(0.028) (0.128) (0.005) (0.027) (0.049) (0.028)
Lag(D_TAYLOR) -0.085 -0.466 *** -0.077 *** -1.253 *** -0.332 *** -0.689 ***
(0.055) (0.046) (0.007) (0.038) (0.045) (0.055)
σu 0.184 0.178 0.164 0.222 0.245 0.216
σe 0.612 0.652 0.636 0.671 0.674 0.628
ρ 0.083 0.076 0.068 0.098 0.103 0.089
R2 0.903 0.874 0.862 0.919 0.957 0.897
within 0.850 0.841 0.838 0.882 0.926 0.872
between 0.970 0.921 0.918 0.967 0.991 0.996
Obs 2190 531 411 2190 531 411
Wald 1975 1598 1486 2725 1638 1810
Note:  This table presents the estimates for an ordinary least squares model specified in eq.(2). The sample is disaggregated into periods 
representing the Great Moderation, the Great Recession, and the period of zero interest rate policy (ZIRP). Following the Federal Reserve, 
the Great Moderation is defined as the period January 1982 - July 2007, the Great Recession as August 2007 - January 2013, and ZIRP is 
defined as December 2008 (when the Fed Funds rate reached the zero-bound) until the end of the sample period. The dependent variable 
is the deviation of the Fed Funds Target from the benchmark Taylor rule (calculated by subtracting the nominal benchmark rate from the 
Fed Funds Target rate in place following the FOMC decision) at time  t . The first two columns use a Taylor Rule calculated on the basis of 
current period (GDP) growth and (GDP deflator) inflation, while the latter two columns use forecasts for growth and inflation obtained 
from the OECD. Cluster robust standard errors (Rogers, 1993) are reported in parantheses. Sample period: January 1982 - February 2014. 
Current-Period Rule Forward-Looking Rule
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Table	8






Constant -3.410 -9.674 -15.944
(2.230) (5.386) (17.072)
AGE -0.047 0.115 0.190
(0.037) (0.094) (0.341)
EDUCATION 0.226 -1.291 -2.625
(0.439) (0.976) (2.839)
P_PARTY 0.458 0.621 1.095
(0.492) (0.647) (1.452)
GENDER -0.202 -2.061 * -4.000
(0.681) (1.111) (2.727)
ACADEMIC 1.029 * 0.264 0.600
(0.539) (0.679) (2.284)
GOVT -1.916 3.945 ** 2.798 **
(4.468) (1.643) (1.321)
INDUSTRY 1.254 ** -0.932 -1.807
(0.574) (0.959) (1.632)
BOG 0.179 0.415 ** 0.326 **
(0.526) (0.179) (0.148)
FOMC_APPT -0.021 -0.034 -0.352
(0.049) (0.077) (0.266)
FED_JOIN 0.051 ** 0.029 0.129
(0.023) (0.041) (0.172)
CHAIR_TIME -0.085 ** 0.139 0.205
(0.035) (0.178) (0.462)
GDP 0.021 0.293 0.174
(0.035) (0.275) (0.357)
INFLATION 0.016 0.650 2.165
(0.149) (1.031) (1.609)
YLD_CURVE 0.092 -0.094 -0.487
(0.111) (0.480) (0.795)
Lag(Dependent) 0.795 *** 4.057 *** 4.849 ***
(0.240) (0.564) (0.834)
ln(σ2v) 0.489 3.153 0.502
(0.395) (0.678) (0.390)
σv 1.277 4.837 1.285
(0.252) (1.640) (0.251)
ρ 0.331 0.876 0.334
(0.087) (0.073) (0.087)
Likelihood-ratio 40.34 59.87 41.22
 Log likelihood -426.19 -57.23 -35.15
Wald (χ2,14) 33.82 61.58 42.51
Obs. 2190 531 411
Note:  This table presents the estimates for the logit model specified in eq.(3). The sample 
is disaggregated into periods representing the Great Moderation, the Great Recession, 
and the period of zero interest rate policy (ZIRP). Following the Federal Reserve, the 
Great Moderation is defined as the period January 1982 - July 2007, the Great Recession 
as August 2007 - January 2013, and ZIRP is defined as December 2008 (when the Fed 
Funds rate reached the zero-bound) until the end of the sample period.  The dependent 
variable is a choice variable relating to the decision made by individual FOMC member k 
at meeting t; the choice to dissent (1) or not (0). Cluster robust standard errors (Rogers, 
1993) are reported in parantheses. Sample period: January 1982 - February 2014. 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Appendix	1
Robustness Test for Education and Career: Factors influencing the FOMC Decision
Dependent Variable: FOMC 
decision
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AGE -0.004 0.006 0.002 0.002
(0.008) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
MASTERS -0.417 * 0.109 0.017 0.019
(0.209) (0.316) (0.290) (0.289)
DOCTORATE -0.583 *** -0.105 -0.044 -0.045
(0.210) (0.317) (0.289) (0.290)
P_PARTY -0.397 *** -0.021 -0.060 -0.009
(0.104) (0.160) (0.145) (0.186)
GENDER 0.003 0.065 0.018 0.018
(0.135) (0.213) (0.192) (0.192)
ACADEMIC 0.965 ** 1.827 ** 1.696 ** 1.688 ***
(0.484) (0.740) (0.674) (0.658)
GOVT 0.243 0.821 0.695 0.678
(0.768) (1.093) (1.006) (0.986)
INDUSTRY 0.364 0.608 0.459 0.448
(0.707) (0.997) (0.919) (0.914)
ACADEMIC*GOVT -0.742 ** -1.609 ** -1.547 ** -1.539 **
(0.367) (0.616) (0.650) (0.631)
ACADEMIC*INDUSTRY -0.304 -0.444 -0.355 -0.354
(0.219) (0.339) (0.309) (0.309)
GOVT*INDUSTRY -0.148 -0.626 -0.459 -0.446
(0.686) (0.965) (0.891) (0.889)
BOG 0.019 0.068 0.037 0.032
(0.114) (0.176) (0.159) (0.192)
FOMC_APPT -0.009 0.169 0.012 0.012
(0.012) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
FED_JOIN 0.006 *** 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
CHAIR_TIME -0.028 *** -0.039 *** -0.045 *** 0.045 ***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
GDP 0.302 *** 0.221 *** 0.221 ***
(0.021) (0.039) (0.039)
INFLATION 0.237 *** 0.225 *** 0.226 ***
(0.035) (0.039) (0.039)
YLD_CURVE -0.314 *** -0.349 *** -0.349 ***
(0.038) (0.041) (0.041)
Lag(D_TAYLOR) 0.295 ** 0.295 **
(0.122) (0.122)
γ1 -0.974 -1.107 -0.852 0.841
(0.866) (1.289) (1.199) (1.202)
γ2 1.477 3.889 3.627 3.616
(0.867) (1.293) (1.202) (1.205)
σ2u 0.066 0.296 0.221 0.221
(0.031) (0.072) (0.065) (0.065)
Obs. 3248 3248 3248
Log-likelihood -3257 -3028 -3025
LR Test v ologit 9.72 85.83 46.38
Wald Chi2 42.42 398.38 411.54
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Note:  This table presents the estimates for robustness testing of the ordered logit model 
specified in eq.(1). The dependent variable is the FOMC decision at time t  and is 
assumed to be a ordered choice to decrease (-1), leave-unchanged (0) or increase (+1) 
the Fed Funds target rate. γ1 and γ2 refer to the cut-points for each decision. Model 4 
differs from Model 3 in only one term, partisan appointments (P_PARTY ) are assigned 
only to members of the Board of Governors, and not FOMC members who are 
presidents of the district Federal Reserve Banks. Cluster robust standard errors (Rogers, 
1993) are reported in parantheses. Sample period: August 1979 - February 2014.
Appendix	2
Dependent Variable: 
Deviation from Taylor Rule
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 11.167 *** 11.982 *** 10.588 *** 10.830 ***
(0.457) (0.620) (0.380) (0.628)
AGE -0.006 -0.007 -0.002 -0.004







P_PARTY 0.183 ** 0.208 ** 0.203 ** 0.212 **
(0.087) (0.088) (0.079) (0.085)
GENDER -0.165 * -0.176 * -0.088 -0.077
(0.084) (0.093) (0.071) (0.067)
ACADEMIC 0.014 0.409 0.037 0.081
(0.093) (0.299) (0.091) (0.382)
GOVT 0.105 0.476 0.059 0.059
(0.110) (0.380) (0.126) (0.457)
INDUSTRY 0.111 -0.564 * 0.096 0.020





GOVT*INDUSTRY 0.549 * 0.128
(0.313) (0.381)
BOG -0.149 * -0.204 ** -0.071 ** -0.065 *
(0.079) (0.093) (0.031) (0.034)
FOMC_APPT -0.021 ** -0.022 ** -0.019 ** -0.021 **
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
FED_JOIN 0.012 *** 0.012 *** 0.010 ** 0.010 **
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
CHAIR_TIME -0.154 *** -0.145 *** -0.169 *** -0.153 ***
(0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.015)
D_CHAIR -2.288 *** -2.317 ***
(0.194) (0.175)
GREENSPAN -2.333 *** -2.339 ***
(0.201) (0.186)
BERNANKE -4.376 *** -4.284 ***
(0.401) (0.419)
D_VCHAIR -0.808 *** -0.866 *** -0.573 *** -0.664 ***
(0.077) (0.082) (0.073) (0.091)
GDP -0.151 *** -0.147 *** -0.122 *** -0.122 ***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.022) (0.022)
INFLATION -0.721 *** -0.697 *** -0.757 *** -0.743 ***
(0.155) (0.152) (0.071) (0.069)
YLD_CURVE -1.428 *** -1.429 *** -1.278 *** -1.285 ***
(0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.029)
Lag(D_TAYLOR) -0.355 *** -0.373 *** -1.256 *** -1.250 ***
(0.115) (0.112) (0.041) (0.041)
σu 0.279 0.273 0.312 0.319
σe 0.984 0.984 1.076 1.076
ρ 0.074 0.071 0.078 0.081
R2 0.830 0.830 0.865 0.865
within 0.693 0.693 0.793 0.793
between 0.951 0.952 0.954 0.954
Obs 3027 3027 3027 3027
Wald 1877 2469 1352 2061
Note:  This table presents the estimates for robustness testing of the ordinary least squares model 
specified in eq.(2). The dependent variable is the deviation of the Fed Funds Target from the 
benchmark Taylor rule (calculated by subtracting the nominal benchmark rate from the Fed Funds 
Target rate in place following the FOMC decision) at time  t . Columns (1) and (2) use a Taylor Rule 
calculated on the basis of current period (GDP) growth and (GDP deflator) inflation, while columns 
(3) and (4) use forecasts for growth and inflation obtained from the OECD. Cluster robust standard 
errors (Rogers, 1993) are reported in parantheses. Sample period: August 1979 - February 2014. 
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Robustness Test for alternate specifications of Chair, Education, and Career: Factors explaining 
policy deviations from Taylor Rule
Appendix	3
Robustness Test for Education and Career: Dissent from FOMC Vote
Panel A Dissent Tighter Easier Language
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -4.922 ** -6.468 ** -3.276 -6.503 *
(2.113) (3.006) (2.428) (2.944)
AGE -0.009 -0.003 -0.049 -0.002
(0.033) (0.047) (0.037) (0.041)
MASTERS -0.425 0.059 -1.619 -0.012
(0.827) (1.146) (0.996) (1.253)
DOCTORATE -0.293 -0.126 -1.002 -0.533
(0.843) (1.174) (0.977) (1.296)
P_PARTY 0.474 0.281 0.723 0.219
(0.434) (0.619) (0.527) (0.575)
GENDER 0.013 -1.631 0.834 -0.565
(0.599) (1.124) (0.585) (1.111)
ACADEMIC 0.902 ** 0.569 0.814 -0.631
(0.367) (1.129) (0.908) (1.022)
GOVT 1.821 -0.245 0.623 0.216
(3.764) (0.163) (0.392) (0.198)
INDUSTRY 0.641 0.931 0.004 -0.591
(0.721) (1.058) (0.888) (0.865)
ACADEMIC*GOVT 0.207 -0.008 0.105 -0.052
(0.697) (0.421) (0.876) (0.645)
ACADEMIC*INDUSTRY 0.107 0.321 0.205 1.465
(0.897) (1.321) (1.075) (1.245)
GOVT*INDUSTRY 0.097 0.121 0.202 0.465
(0.497) (0.321) (0.856) (0.451)
BOG 0.841 * -1.545 ** -0.393 1.111
(0.475) (0.714) (0.533) (0.727)
FOMC_APPT -0.007 -0.015 0.007 0.391 **
(0.042) (0.056) (0.060) (0.166)
FED_JOIN 0.037 * 0.048 * 0.018 -0.029
(0.020) (0.027) (0.022) (0.033)
CHAIR_TIME -0.064 ** -0.086 ** 0.000 -0.101 ***
(0.027) (0.034) (0.046) (0.031)
GDP 0.071 0.021 0.201 ** 0.115
(0.045) (0.057) (0.078) (0.118)
INFLATION 0.090 0.018 0.212 * -0.008
(0.076) (0.097) (0.121) (0.235)
YLD_C 0.065 0.081 -0.027 0.749 **
(0.089) (0.112) (0.152) (0.312)
Lag(Dependent) 1.410 *** 1.774 *** 1.074 *** 4.768 ***
(0.196) (0.242) (0.405) (0.521)
ln(σ2v) 0.554 1.157 1.006 1.358
(0.324) (0.365) (0.347) (0.370)
σv 1.319 1.783 1.003 1.972
(0.214) (0.326) (0.324) (0.720)
ρ 0.346 0.491 0.234 0.542
(0.073) (0.091) (0.116) (0.181)
Likelihood-ratio 65.69 68.79 25.96 14.58
 Log likelihood -598.46 -397.09 -241.47 -88.02
Wald (χ2,14) 86.15 88.22 33.02 125.17
Obs. 3027 3027 3027 3027
***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Note:  This table presents the estimates for robustness testing of the logit model specified in 
eq.(3). The dependent variable is a choice variable relating to the decision made by individual 
FOMC member k  at meeting t . In column (1) the dependent variable is the choice to dissent 
(1) or not (0). In column (2) the choice is dissent in favour of tighter monetary policy than 
decided by the FOMC as whole (1) or not. In column (3) the choice is dissent in favour of 
easier monetary policy (1) or not (0). Column (4) reflects a choice between dissent on the 
grounds of language used (1) or not (0).  Cluster robust standard errors (Rogers, 1993) are 
reported in parantheses.  Sample period: August 1979 - February 2014.
